Eurasian Energy Politics and Security Research Paper

Eurasian Energy Politics and Security - Research Paper ExampleThe existing projects and pipelines in the midst of Russia and the EU, including the issues in these projects shall be discussed. Alternatives to Russia, especially South Caucasus and central Asia will also be considered. The proposed pipelines, Nabucco, Transcaspian pipeline, and BPs new project for natural gas shall be include in this discussion. Finally, Chinas entrance to Eurasian energy politics shall also be considered under this discussion. This paper is being discussed in order to conceive a clear understanding of energy politics, including its significant points of interest which now impact on the current relations between Eurasian nations.States in the Caspian and rally Asian region have proven oil color reserves numbering about 38 billion barrels and this does not include possibly undetected barrels of crude oil in the region (Cohen and DeCarlo-Souza, p. 5). Kazakhstan is considered to be the largest oil p roducer in the region with onshore fields in the northern Caspian ocean and other regions. Turkmenistan is the largest natural gas producer in the Caspian region and is serving the energy needs of the region well. Since the Caspian oil reserves were discovered, most energy exports from the Caspian and Central Asia came from the Caspian and Central Asia came from the Russian Empire, supplying consumers in Europe and Soviet Union (Cohen and DeCarlo-Souza, p. 5). Significant exports from the Caspian started with the establishment of the 1997 100,000 Baku-Novorossiysk pipelines transporting oil to Georgias Black Sea shore (Cohen and DeCarlo-Souza, p. 5). In 2001, Kazakhstan started pumping oil from its Tengiz oil field into Novorossiysk via the Caspian Pipeline Consortium or the CPC. The CPC is shared by various oil companies from different countries. Russia lost its control of the Caspian oil exports in 2005 when the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline was opened (Cohen and DeCarlo-Sou za, p. 5).